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The Chilean development story of the last two to three decades is a mix of successes in 
the macro, growth, poverty and trade fronts but also of failure in reducing chronic 
inequality of income and wealth. In addition, the current growth patterns have serious 
impacts on the environment, natural resources and energy demand. Adverse features of 
the Chilean development model include urban insecurity and rising crime, pollution, 
pressure on natural resources, congestion and social stratification in access to education, 
health and pensions. A reduction in social inequality would require changes in several 
fronts: more public-sector resources devoted to education; curtailing current 
concentration of wealth and market shares in banking, retail trade, and private pensions 
systems, private health provision, and other sectors; more effective regulation of big 
business; rebalancing of labour unions’ bargaining power capacities and   
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effective support to the sector of small and medium size enterprises. Chilean democracy 
would benefit from a redefinition in development priorities towards less power for the 
dominant elites (economic and political) and broader social participation for the middle 
class and the working people to support dynamic and more equitable development.  
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The Chilean economy is often praised for its achievements in growth, macroeconomic 
sustainability, low inflation, external openness and reduced poverty. The fact that Chile 
started early with the type of reforms later known under the term ‘Washington 
consensus’ made it the ‘privileged student’ of international financial institutions. Today, 
in the wake of an international financial crisis, the Chilean economy has the capacity to 
ameliorate the effect of adverse external shocks, given the high level of foreign assets 
accumulated by the treasury as a result of the record copper prices until mid 2008. This 
paper assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the Chilean model based on neoliberal 
economic policies, combined with the more active social policies but in the context of 
persistent inequality of income and wealth.  
The Chilean development story of the last two-three decades is a mix of reasonable 
successes in the macro, growth and trade fronts but also of the failure to reduce chronic 
inequality of income and wealth. In addition, the current growth patterns can have 
considerable impacts on the environment, natural resources and energy demand. The 
Chilean development path of the last two decades combines rising GDP per person and 
increases in material welfare with productive modernization and integration to the world 
economy. At the same time, however, there are some unpleasant features of the 
development model: urban insecurity, rising crime, pollution, pressures on natural 
resources, congestion and social stratification in the access to education, health and 
pensions.  
There are similarities and differences between the economic policies applied by the 
military regime of General Pinochet and those of the democratic administrations in 
power since 1990. The free market revolution of the mid-1970s in Chile was a sharp 
departure from the historical pattern of economic and social policies in the country and 
in most of the developing world. It is apparent that this economic revolution was largely 
possible in the controlled political conditions that constituted an absence of both 
congress and free press, banned left-wing political parties, highly controlled labour 
unions and the strong military rule that had characterized Chilean politics since the oust 
of Salvador Allende in September 1973 until the late 1980s. The democratic 
government that came to power in March 1990 (after free elections in 1989) chose to 
maintain the bulk of the economic policies of the military (open trade, the primacy of 
markets and the private sector, privatization), complementing these with more active 
social policies oriented towards poverty reduction and protection of vulnerable social 
groups. The new governments also started to invest more in public education, public 
health and in the physical infrastructure, sectors neglected during the military period. 
The democratic governments have also been macroeconomically prudent, maintaining 
low inflation and fiscal and balance of payments sustainability. In addition, they have 
followed a general policy of increasing public savings during the good times and this 
has allowed a degree of countercyclical fiscal policies after the onset of the global 
slump of 2008-09. Still, the high public savings may not fully insulate the Chilean 
economy from external shocks and other internal vulnerabilities. Moreover, the fact that 
the state was sitting on a large volume of public savings while critical problems in 
public education, public health, the environment were not addressed is controversial.    
Despite the measures undertaken by the democratic governments in the post-Pinochet 
regime to reduce poverty and improve social protection, reducing wealth and income 
inequality has not been an explicit and active target of policy. In fact, social inequality, 2 
wealth and market concentration and social stratification have not diminished at all 
(they may have even increased) in the post-Pinochet period.  
The main purpose of this paper is to look at the achievements, failures and dilemmas of 
the current development model in Chile with a view of drawing useful lessons for other 
developing countries and for renewing development policies that correct the 
shortcomings of the current Chilean economic model.  
Since the mid-1980s, Chile has accelerated its annual average GDP growth rate by 
nearly 2.5 percentage points above the average growth rate of the 1940-85 period (in 
turn, growth was much faster in the 1986-98 period than in the 1998-2007 ). The 
increase in the average growth of the last two decades has taken place while the country 
was able to maintain low inflation, fiscal solvency, balance-of-payments sustainability 
and to reduce public external debt. Currently, macroeconomic policies are guided by a 
combination of inflation targeting by the central bank, a fiscal rule of structural fiscal 
surpluses and a flexible exchange rate regime. This regime has facilitated the low 
inflation rate and policy predictability. However, growth cycles, although of a milder 
magnitude than in the past, prevail as do significant fluctuations in the nominal and real 
exchange rate. This is worrisome for an economy, such as in Chile that is very open to 
international trade and capital mobility. The exchange rate (peso/U$) in 2008 suffered 
wild fluctuations: appreciating in the first quarter of 2008 by more than 10 per cent 
against the US dollar, but then the central bank announced a policy of buying dollars to 
halt the peso appreciation. With the onset of the financial crisis, the exchange rate 
depreciated by almost 35 per cent in nominal terms between September and October.  
Following a cycle of strong copper prices that lasted until mid 2008, Chile had 
accumulated nearly US$26 billion in external public-sector assets. Before the crisis, the 
policy of running high fiscal savings, of the magnitude of 7-8 per cent of GDP, was 
controversial. As said, observers argued that the country needed to devote public 
resources to improve the quality of public education, public health, provide 
environmental protection and to tackle the sharp rise in crime and urban insecurity. 
These issues are still very relevant but in retrospect, the policy of high fiscal savings 
also provides a good cushion against the worsening external environment.  
The workings of the labour market and labour relations policies in Chile have been also 
controversial topics. The fragile nature of many jobs and the reduced bargaining power 
of labour versus capital have biased the distribution of productivity gains towards 
company owners. In this context, large private sector associations along with orthodox 
economists (a very influential group in Chile) call for more labour market flexibility, 
understood as easier rules for firing workers. In contrast, labour unions are making 
demands for greater job protection and a rebalancing of labour-capital relations. 
Emerging labour conflicts in copper, salmon, fishery and other areas reflect the 
demands of a labour movement that over the years has been largely marginalized in a 
country becoming steadily more prosperous and open to globalization. New, modern, 
and more equitable labour relations are badly needed in Chile. 
In the last two-three decades, economic growth in Chile has been mainly driven by 
external markets. However, the trade structure of the Chilean economy has the capacity 
to generate merely moderate employment. In fact, export and import-competing 
activities generate only 30 per cent of total employment while the ‘non-traded’ goods 
sector accounts for the remaining 70 per cent. The relation between aggregate growth 3 
and social welfare of the poor is mediated by the labour market and the socio-
demographic characteristics of low-income families. Empirical evidence from 
household surveys shows that aggregate economic growth reaches comparatively fewer 
poor households than non-poor households for at least three reasons:  
–  First, poor families have higher dependency ratios so the income of each worker 
has to be divided among more family members than in non-poor families.  
–  Second, the earning capacity of a poor household worker is expected to be lower 
than of a worker, professional or executive from a non-poor household, as 
education levels are systematically lower for low-income families.  
–  Third, unemployment rates are much higher in poor families than in non-poor 
families. Moreover, the poor tend to work more in the informal sector, a sector 
with lower productivity that pays smaller salaries and where jobs are unstable.  
Inequality is a persistent feature of the Chilean society. In the last 20 years Gini 
coefficients for income have hovered around 0.55, certainly a high figure by 
international standards. Recently, some mild reduction has taken place in the coefficient 
but the broad trend is that income is highly concentrated in the top 5-10 per cent of the 
distribution. Gini coefficients for the first to the ninth deciles are around 0.38, not too 
far from the Gini coefficients of the overall income distribution in OECD countries, but 
inequality in Chile is mainly explained by the income concentration at the top.  
The environmental and natural resource implications of the acceleration in economic 
growth and the rise in consumption levels of the last two decades deserve more attention 
and analysis. Two-thirds of Chilean exports, the main engine for growth, are composed 
of both non-renewable and renewable natural resources. In addition, the rapid expansion 
of consumption increases the stock of cars and transport vehicles, adding to emissions. 
Worrisome trends as identified in a recent OECD-ECLAC report on the state of the 
environment in Chile are the high intensity of energy output and consumption, the 
heavy use of water resources and soil, high exploitation of forestry, rapid extraction of 
sea products and aggressive mining extraction.  
The paper is organized in five sections in addition to this introduction. Section 2 
provides an overview of the Chilean economy from a medium- to long-run perspective 
and section 3 analyses the main features of the macroeconomic policies and the 
economic growth in Chile in the 1990-2007, for a comparison of the economic 
performance of the Aylwin, Frei, Lagos and Bachelet administrations. Section 4 looks at 
the joint behaviour of growth, poverty and inequality in the last 20 years (a story of 
reasonably rapid growth, decline in poverty but persistent inequality) and provides data 
on income and wealth distribution. This section also looks at the causes of the 
persistence of inequality and role that the policies of the last two decades may have 
played in this. The section also documents the rise in crime and urban insecurity. 
Section 5 reviews the factors that impinge on the development potential of the Chilean 
economy such as education, spending on science and technology, cost of doing 
business, institutional capacities and other factors. Section 6 concludes.  4 
2  The Chilean economy in a long-run perspective: a brief overview
1 
Between 1940 and 1985, Chile grew at a moderate GDP growth rate of 3.5 per cent per 
year. In turn, GDP per capita in the same period grew by 1.4 per cent per year (see 
Table 1), indicating that at this pace it would take nearly four decades for GDP per 
capita to double. This growth often took place in a context of chronic inflation, recurrent 
balance-of-payment and fiscal imbalances and distributive conflict in an unequal 
society. Attempts at economic modernization and management of social conflict were 
generally mediated by democratic institutions. However, from the mid-1960s to 1973, 
the accelerated pace of democratization, popular participation and economic 
redistribution generated acute tension and resistance among upper-income groups 
within the society. The attempt by President Allende to build Chilean-style socialism 
within democracy was actively supported by the working class and sectors of the middle 
class but also strongly opposed by the national economic elites and the Republican 
government in the US, forming a coalition that was able to create a level of social 
tension and economic disruption that ultimately led to a breakdown of democracy in 
1973. After the collapse of democracy, the instauration of a military regime in 
September 1973 turned rapidly into a radical revolution to reshape Chile along free 
market lines within a de-politicized and demobilized society. The centrepiece of the 
economic policies of the military regime revolved around macro-adjustment, economic 
liberalization and privatization of both state-owned enterprises and social services. The 
average record of economic growth during the military regime was moderate, but 
punctuated with severe economic crises. In 1990 the Pinochet regime was replaced by a 
democratically elected coalition of the Concertación por la Democracia which has been 
in power for the last 20 years. As mentioned before, the democratic regime after 
Pinochet tried initially to find a balance between continuity and change in economic 
policies that would combine free markets with increased social protection without 
attempting to alter existing income and wealth distribution. Growth, the first of the 
democratic administrations’ aims as outlined in the mantra—growth with equity—was 
better achieved than the second. Equity was to wait, except if equity is perceived of as 
the reduction of poverty, which is largely a by-product of rapid economic growth.  
Let us return to Chile’s recent economic history. In the 1960s the prevailing economic 
model of import substitution was showing signs of exhaustion, reflected in moderate 
growth, fiscal and external imbalances, chronic inflation and persistent inequality. The 
conservative Alessandri administration (1958-64) focused largely on managing several 
macroeconomic crises of varying intensity but without articulating a clear agenda of 
structural change of the prevailing development model. The Christian Democratic 
administration of President Frei Montalva (1964-70) started a programme of economic 
reforms (trade reform, agrarian reform, more inclusive credit policies), along with a 
progressive social agenda, accompanied by an expanding social organization of urban 
dwellers and peasants. The average rate of economic growth in 1960-69 was 4.4 per 
cent per year (2 per cent in per capita terms). Inflation stubbornly remained at around 26 
per cent per annum and the country lived with chronic external and fiscal imbalances.2 
In 1970 the left-wing coalition of President Salvador Allende, United Popular (Popular 
                                                 
1   This section draws partly on Solimano and Pollack (2006).  
2   Complete reference of economic policies in the 1950-70 period is given in Ffrench-Davis (1973). A 
long-run view of the Chilean economy is represented in Meller (1997), and analyses of the Allende 
experience include studies by Bitar (1979), Larraín and Meller (1990), Maldonado (1993), and others. 5 
Unity), won the national elections around an economic and social programme of 
transition to socialism (entailing nationalization of the copper mines, expropriation of 
large industrial firms, banks and other financial institutions and acceleration of agrarian 
reform). The Allende government undertook expansionary fiscal and wage policies 
coupled with price controls. This generated a growing fiscal deficit that was financed by 
money creation. In 1972, repressed inflation and shortages became pervasive, starting to 
alienate the middle class against the government. Inflation became very high and open 
in 1973. Eventually acute internal political conflict, external covert intervention and the 
economic crisis led to a military coup in September 1973 that ousted the Allende 
government and inaugurated 17 years of military rule, personalized by General Augusto 
Pinochet. In the economic arena, the military regime devoted efforts to stabilize the 
inflation (see Figure 5), restitution of property to former owners and securing external 
credits. Money-based stabilization was complemented by a drastic fiscal adjustment 
programme in which nearly 100,000 public employees were separated from the state 
sector in one year, leading to a jump in the unemployment rate that remained high for 
several years. Trade liberalization, privatization, fiscal adjustment and market 
liberalization policies dominated the second half of the 1970s. Between 1978 and 1982, 
an exchange rate based stabilization programme was used to reduce inflation, but the 
experiment ended in a severe economic and financial crisis in 1982.3 The economy 
suffered a sharp decline in GDP, a jump in unemployment and bankruptcies, 
accompanied by a crisis in the banking sector, recurrent currency devaluation and 
serious external debt servicing problems. Crisis management at that time involved the 
bailout of firms and banks, a real depreciation of the currency that restored profitability 
in tradable goods activities and a cut in domestic absorption. These policies were 
supported by loans from the IMF, World Bank and IDB. The social consequences were 
dire.4 Unemployment climbed to nearly 30 per cent in 1983, real wages fell and many 
small- and medium-scale firms drowned in debt or went bankrupt, with the ensuing 
destruction of organizational capital and jobs.  
In the second half of the 1980s the Chilean economy recovered, with the support of 
measures such as a more competitive real exchange rate, the financial rehabilitation of 
firms, tax cuts, easier credit and higher internal demand. However, by the end of the 
1980s inflationary pressures as well as external imbalances mounted, leading 
subsequently to the new Aylwin administration—the first democratic government 
elected after 17 years of Pinochet rule—to address these issues. In addition, the Aylwin 
government raised taxes to fund social programmes oriented to reverting the social 
deterioration of the previous years in terms of minimum wages, reduced monetary 
subsidies to the poor and the chronic under-funding of the public health and education 
systems. Fiscal resources were also needed to start revamping the public infrastructure 
such as ports, roads and highways that had deteriorated after years of little public 
investment. Macroeconomic policies in the 1990s (see the next section) accommodated 
higher social spending while reducing inflation, taxed short-term capital inflows, and 
reduced public external debt. The Lagos administration furthered conservative fiscal 
policies by adopting the explicit rule of fiscal surplus, achieved a further reduction in 
                                                 
3  References for that period include Ffrench-Davis (2002), Edwards and Edwards (1987), Solimano 
(1993, 1999), Foxley (1983), Corbo and Solimano (1991), Meller (1997), Solimano and Pollack 
(2006) and others. 
4   See Solimano, Aninat and Birdsall (2000).  6 
inflation but suspended the tax on short-term capital inflows and supported a floating 
exchange rate regime with minimal central bank intervention. The Bachelet 
administration, which assumed power in March 2006, is the fourth government of the 
coalition that has governed Chile since 1990. In recent years, as mentioned, Chile has 
enjoyed a spectacular surge in copper prices that generated current account surpluses 
and a very strong fiscal surplus of the order of 7-8 per cent of GDP. However, average 
economic growth in 1996-97 did not accelerate much (4.7 per cent), creating the 
conundrum of a sharp terms-of-trade boom with relatively modest growth. By late 2008 
the government is reacting to the effects of the external crisis with the support of a 
relatively large accumulation of fiscal savings. 
3  Growth performance and macroeconomic policies  
under the democratic administrations 
3.1 Growth  performance 
In the last 22 years the rate of economic growth accelerated in Chile in comparison to its 
historical record. In fact, as Table 1 shows, the average GDP growth rate over the period 
1986-2007 was close to 6 per cent per year. In contrast, the historical rate of growth of 
the period 1940-85 was only 3.4 per cent.  
Table 1 
Chile: Economic and social indicators, 1940-2007 
  1998-2007 1986-97 1986-2007 1940-85 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Macroeconomic  indicators 
Real GDP, rate of growth (% annual)1  3.85 7.61 5.9  3.35 
Real GDP per capita, rate of growth (% annual)1  2.68 5.81 4.39 1.38 
Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP)2  21.46 22.62 22.09 14.33 
Gross national savings (% of GDP)3  26.58 26.60 26.59 16.37 
Total factor productivity (index 1960=100)4  129.16 104.50 114.36 102.78 
Fiscal balance (% of GDP)5  1.14 1.68 1.45  -1.28 
Inflation rate (annual change%)6 3.32  15.06  9.72  38.31 
 External  sector 
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)2  35.86 26.90 30.70 16.50 
Current account balance (% of GDP)3 -0.48  -3.25  -2.1 -4.6 
Terms of trade (Jan 1997=100)7 116.8  97.28  105.6  125.1 
Real exchange rate (index 2000=100)7 93.2  89.79  91.2  147.1 
 Employment 
Unemployment rate (% annual)6  8.95 8.02 8.4 13.3 
Real wages (index 2000=100)8  103.4 76.2 87.9 66.8 
 Income  distribution 
Gini index9  54.51 54.96 54.8  50.4 
Ratio between 1st & 10th decile (autonomous income)10 34.35 34.79 34.6   
Sources and notes:  
    Own elaborations based on data from: 
  1  For the years 1940-60, Díaz, Lüders and Wagner (2007); for the years 1940-60, World Bank 
(2007), and for the years 1990-2006, ECLAC (2006); 
  2  Braun et al. (2000: 65-6); elaborated from Central Bank of Chile, based on a series in 
current values; data only until the year 2006 for columns (1) and (3) for exports. 
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Sources and notes to Table 1 (cont’d) 
  3  Central Bank of Chile (in constant LCU 2003). Data for columns (1) and (3) for the period 
1960-2006; 
  4  Fuentes, Larraín and Schmidt-Hebbel (2006). The results reported correspond to a simple 
average from period to period of the TFP measures 4 and 8 from the Appendix 2 of Fuentes, 
Larraín and Schmidt-Hebbel. Data for columns (1) and (3) for the years 1960-2005; 
  5  For the years 1940-69, ILPES-ECLAC (n.d.) based on official information; for the years 
1986-89, Bennett and Valdés (2001); for the period 1990-2006, the Ministry of Finance 
(2007); data available only until the 2006 for columns (1) and (3);  
 6  INE  (n.d.) 
  7  World Bank (2007); data for columns (1) and (3) available up to the year 2006 only. 
  8  Merged series: for 1986-94 (base = 1980) from the Central Bank of Chile; for the years 
1994-2006 (base = 2006) from INE (n.d.). Data available up to the year 2006. 
  9  Ministry of Planning (CASEN 2006 Report); for the years 1960-86 and 1988, 1990-91, 1993, 
1995, 1997, 1999, 2001-02, 2004-06 from Larrañaga (2001) and updates. Column (4) is the 
average of the 1958-85 period. 
  10  Ministry of Planning (CASEN 2006 Report). Data available only for the years 1987, 1989, 
1992, 1994, 1996, 2000, 2003 and 2006. 
 
 
In per capita terms, the rate of growth of GDP was 4.4 per cent in the period 1986-2007 
compared to an annual GDP growth of 1.4 per cent per head in 1940-85. This increase 
in per capita growth is expected to have made a big difference in the standard of living 
of the ‘average citizen’ although in a country with an uneven income distribution, the 
concept remains fuzzy. As we document in this paper, income distribution has been—
and continues to be—very concentrated in Chile. In turn, wealth distribution is even 
more concentrated than income distribution as ownership of financial assets, productive  
wealth and land is often very concentrated (see Davies et al. 2006 for international 
evidence on this). On the other hand, as a consequence of reasonably rapid growth in  
conjunction with the targeted social transfers, measured poverty declined sharply in the  
 
Figure 1 
Chile: Economic growth, 1940-2007 
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Source:   Own elaboration based on data from Díaz, Lüders and Wagner (2007). 8 
last 20 years or so, dropping from over 42 per cent in the late 1980s to approximately 14 
per cent in 2006. As Figure 1 shows, according to the data, a turning point in the growth 
dynamics of the 1940-2007 period took place in the mid to later 1980s.  
The acceleration in economic growth in the last two decades deserves more analysis.5 
The Chilean growth story of this period reflects the favourable effect of 
macroeconomic, social and political stability, a strong reliance on the markets—the 
‘neoliberal component’—along with a more consolidated private sector with an 
increased capacity to mobilize savings and undertake large-scale projects. The external 
environment (terms of trade, foreign demand) experienced various cycles during this 
period, so no discernable net positive or negative effect can be easily established. 
Analyses of the sources of growth, based on the supply-side, often decompose output 
growth into factor accumulation (capital, labour, human capital) and total factor 
productivity growth (improvement in the degree of efficiency at which productive 
resources are used). In turn, we can undertake a more eclectic growth-analysis by 
looking at both supply and demand factors such as savings, investment, productivity, 
exports, private and public consumption. In summary, the following factors are likely to 
be at work in the acceleration of economic growth in Chile since the mid to late 1980s: 
i)  An increase of over 7 percentage points of GDP in investments in 1986-2007 
compared to the historical period, 1940-85.  
ii)  An increase of around 10 percentage points of GDP in national savings in both 
periods. 
iii)  An acceleration of total factor productivity growth.6 
iv)  A sharp rise in the export share in GDP, which almost doubled in 1986-2007 
compared to the historical reference period.  
v)  A steady overall decline in inflation. 
vi)  A shift from fiscal deficits to fiscal balance and surpluses.  
vii)  A lower reliance on external savings and a cut in current account deficits in the 
balance of payments.  
viii)  After the restoration of democracy in 1990, a climate of political and social 
stability, in spite of persistent inequality. 
The shift from import substitution to external opening was intended to accelerate 
growth, and this was largely accomplished. In an economy with fewer distortions, 
market prices play a more effective role in signalling scarcities and thus resources will 
go to activities with higher profitability. This process leads to a more efficient resource 
allocation. However, going from better resource allocation to sustained growth also 
requires a higher rate of accumulation of human and physical capital and faster 
productivity growth. In Chile, part of that process effectively took place in the last two 
decades as the list of factors above shows.  
However, the causality from the implementation of market reforms to growth outcomes 
is complex: it involves lags and is affected by other important variables. In fact, Chile 
                                                 
5   For studies on growth in Chile, see Fuentes et al. (2006), De Gregorio (2004), and Solimano (2006).  
6  See Fuentes, Larraín and Schmidt-Hebbel (2006).  9 
liberalized markets, opened the economy to international competition and privatized 
public enterprises in the second half of the 1970s but economic growth started to pick-
up in a more steady manner in the second half of the 1980s and then finally in the 
1990s, in other words, more than a decade after the policies of macro stabilization, 
external opening, privatization and liberalization of financial markets were launched. In 
the first phase of the implementation of these policies, growth was highly cyclical: 
recovery and growth took place in 1976-81 but was followed by a big contraction in 
economic activity and financial crisis in 1982-83 as documented in the previous section. 
It is interesting to note that the harvesting of growth really took place in the democratic 
period. This induces to suggest that democracy gave the domestic and international 
legitimacy to the Chilean economic model and provided considerable social and 
political stability for investment and growth to increase and promote more rapid growth. 
In turn, rapid growth also helped to legitimize the democracy and the economic model 
although persistent inequality (not only growth) may at the same time reduce the overall 
degree of legitimacy of the economic model.  
The growth dynamics of the last twenty years were not uniform across the subperiods 
(for a graphical picture of the evolution of the main macro and growth variables see 
Figures 2, 3 and 4). The differences within the period were considerable as the average 
GDP growth rate in the 1986-97 subperiod was almost double that of 1998-2007 (7.6 per 
cent per year in the first period and only 3.9 percent per year in the second period). 
Cyclical factors certainly affected this differential growth performance. In the second half 
of the 1980s the Chilean economy still had unused capacities as it was recovering from a 
major economic contraction earlier in the decade. In turn, the economy was affected after 
1998 by the Asian and Russian crises of 1997-87 and growth remained sluggish for nearly 
five years after the onset of the crises. Economic growth has accelerated since 2004 but 
not in proportion to the sharp rise in copper prices. Chile seems to be a special case in 
which the strong term-of-trade boom has not translated into faster economic growth. This 
may be explained in part by a fiscal policy oriented to saving most of the terms-of-trade 
bonanza. In 2008, Chile had nearly 26 billion dollars, deposited abroad mostly in US 
banks as part of its economic and social stabilization fund. This is in addition to nearly 
17 billion held by the central bank in international reserves.  
Figure 2 
Chile: Gross domestic product, 1986-2007 
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Chile: Investment, savings, and productivity, 1986-2006 
Panel A: Investment  
(% of GDP, series at constant prices) 
Panel B: Investment 




Panel C: Total factor productivity  
(TFP, annual rate of change %) 
 
Panel D: Gross national savings 
(% of GDP, current values) 
 
 





Chile: Exports, consumption, and terms of trade, 1986-2006 
Panel A: Exports  
(as % of GDP) 
Panel B: Government consumption 
(annual rate of change) 
  Figure 4 continues 
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Figure 4 (cont’d) 
Chile: Exports, consumption, and terms of trade, 1986-2006 
  
Panel C: Terms of trade  
(Index 1996=100) 
Panel D: Private consumption  
(annual rate of change) 
Source:  Own elaboration based on data from the Central Bank of Chile. 
 
 
3.3  Unsettling features of the Chilean growth pattern 
Sir John Hicks, the famous British economist, maintains that sustainable real income is 
one in which future generations are not impaired by current savings and investment 
decisions. This is a relevant concept for evaluating the sustainability of Chilean growth, 
particularly due to its excessive reliance on natural resources (renewable and non-
renewable), high intensity in energy use, productive concentration and environmental 
implications. Critical issues in this regard are the following:  
i)  Natural resource sustainability. It is estimated that around 70 per cent of 
Chilean exports (more than 35 per cent of GDP) rely on raw materials and 
processed renewable and non-renewable natural resources: copper, fruits, 
fishmeal, timber and others. For a country that has managed to grow at an 
average rate of around 6 per cent per year for more than two decades under this 
strategy, the pressures of this growth pattern can be significant on natural 
resources and the environment.  
ii)  Energy intensity of growth. A recent evaluation by the OECD jointly with 
ECLAC on the environmental and energy consequences of rapid growth in 
Chile warns that this process is having significant impacts on the energy 
intensity of Chilean consumption, and growth is above unity. It is indicative 
that the country is currently facing electricity shortages due to an excessive 
reliance on imported natural gas and a lack of diversification towards other 
sources of domestic energy, including clean sources of energy.7 
iii)  Environmental impacts of rapid growth. There are potentially serious 
consequences of the rapid growth process on the environment as highlighted in 
the OECD/ECLAC report. The effects are varied in nature and resources 
                                                 
7  An early analysis of the pressure of rapid growth on water resources, energy, forestry and the 
environment in Chile is given in Sunkel (1994).  12 
devoted to prevention and mitigation are still limited.8 Rapid growth in GDP 
and consumption has a direct effect on the environment because of substantial 
emissions, the high-intensity of energy output and consumption, use of water 
resources and soil, high exploitation of forestry, rapid extraction of sea 
products and aggressive mining extraction, as well as a sharp increase in the 
stock of cars and transport vehicles. 
iv)  Firm concentration. Exports, the main engine of growth, are largely 
concentrated in large firms. The direct share of exports by small- and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) is very small (less than 3 per cent of total exports). 
This emphasis on the productive structure mirrors the concentration of incomes 
that characterizes the Chilean economy (see Table 2 and Solimano 2007).  
v)  Employment intensity of growth. Growth is envisaged as the main source of 
employment generation in Chile. However, given the importance of capital-
intensive tradable sectors such as copper and other activities, the employment 
intensity of growth is not very high, with a medium term employment-growth 
elasticity of around 0.5.  
Table 2 
Chile: Exports shares by firm size, 1999-2003 
Year  Micro & small  Medium  Large  Total 
1999 1.8  3.5  94.7 100.0 
2000 1.7  3.1  95.2 100.0 
2001 1.5  3.4  95.1 100.0 
2002 1.4  3.2  95.4 100.0 
2003 1.3  2.6  96.1 100.0 
  Source:  Own elaboration based on data from Customs Office and SII (2003). 
3.3 Macroeconomic  policies 
During the last two-three decades, a strong policy consensus developed in Chile on the 
need to ensure macroeconomic stability for development. The country suffered the 
traumas of fiscal and inflationary crises in the 1970s and currency and financial collapse 
in the early 1980s that interrupted economic growth and created big surges in 
unemployment, declines in real wages and human welfare. The macro policies of the 
1990s were gradualist on the anti-inflationary front, the exchange rate regime was 
‘managed’ until 1999, fiscal policy was generally prudent but without an explicit fiscal 
rule (until 2000) and taxes to deter short-term capital inflows were used until 2000 when 
they were removed (a summary of these policies and their evolution in Table 4). In the 
2000s macroeconomic policies included some innovation. A fiscal rule was introduced 
and the central bank established a more explicit a policy of ‘inflation targeting’ regime. 
Apparently the search for rules replaced discretion as the new conventional wisdom. Let 
us look at these policies in some more detail.  
                                                 
8  OCDE and CEPAL (2005).  13 
Fiscal policy 
In 2000 the Lagos administration formalized a fiscal rule to make fiscal policy more 
predictable and also to deter possible pressures on fiscal spending coming from political 
parties, parliamentarians, interest groups and others, reducing the degree of discretion in 
fiscal spending, forcing increases to align with what were considered as permanent rises 
in copper prices, potential GDP and other sources of revenues. Thus, cyclical 
improvement in terms of trade or transitory increases in tax revenues due to faster 
economic growth are not to trigger proportional or more than proportional increases in 
public spending, often the source of macro imbalances and unsustainable cycles in Latin 
America. The new rule in 2000 stipulated that the government was to run a structural 
fiscal surplus of 1 per cent of GDP (the structural budget is calculated using 
medium-run projections of the main sources of fiscal revenues such as copper prices 
and the GDP growth rate). Later, the Bachelet administration reduced the specific value 
of the structural surplus to 0.5 per cent of GDP. The rule is also consistent with some 
degree of counter-cyclical fiscal policy as it allows the government to run deficits in 
years when GDP is below full capacity level, financed by the surpluses accumulated in 
good years. The degree of countercyclical polices is open to debate. For example, 
aggregate demand polices in 2000-03 were mildly countercyclical in spite of favourable 
conditions for accelerating a recovery of growth and employment at a time of low 
inflation, existing unused capacity and access to external borrowing at low cost. Also 
the dramatic surge in copper prices since 2006 has not been followed by an acceleration 
in growth. Most of the bonanza has been saved by the government: the fiscal surplus 
was 7.7 per cent of GDP in 2006 and 8.8 per cent in 2007. The surpluses are deposited 
in an economic and social stabilization fund held abroad, (hopefully) earning safe but 
modest returns. As a consequence of a very favourable fiscal position, particularly in 
US dollars, the Chilean public sector is a net creditor in dollars terms and maintains a 
small internal public debt (public debt has declined from 39 per cent of GDP in 1990 to 
4.9 per cent in 2007). 
Exchange rate policy 
Since September 1999, Chile has operated under a system of flexible exchange rates 
that replaced the ‘adjustable band (managed)’ system of the 1990s (see Figure 6). The 
management of the adjustable band regime was not simple, as persistent capital inflows 
during most of the 1990s, mainly until 1997, exerted a ‘downward’ pressure on the 
exchange rate (to appreciate), moving the market exchange rate to the floor of the band 
(see Figure 7). The central bank engaged in expensive sterilization operations to 
counteract the monetary effect of massive purchases of foreign exchange. In 1998-99, a 
tight monetary policy was complemented with a policy of reduced exchange rate 
flexibility (this move narrowed the band, reducing the distance between the floor and 
the ceiling of the band) in face of adverse terms-of-trade shocks and a reduction in 
capital inflows. The policy was surprising, as adjustments to adverse external shocks 
that can not be fully financed in general require more (not less) exchange rate 
flexibility. The experience of current flexible exchange rates without intervention in the 
2000-08 period has been of large fluctuations in the nominal exchange rate, as is shown 
in Figure 6.9 This is an issue that deserves attention as price (exchange arte) signals 
                                                 
9   The central bank has intervened in the foreign exchange market in very few occasions and only under 
pressure for depreciation of the exchange rate: once in 2001 associated with a certain instability 
created by the September 11th incident and the crisis of the Argentinean currency board. The other 
main intervention was in 2002 after turbulence linked to the Brazilian elections. 14 
containing a lot of volatility introduce noise for exporters and import competing firms. 
Again, the dominating belief by the authorities in Chile for a while was that the 
exchange rate market is to be left undisturbed, and that any central bank intervention is 
ultimately futile. The problem is that this undisturbed market equilibrium may yield an 
exchange rate level (i.e., too overvalued) and also volatility that may have adverse real 
effects on economic activity and the profitability of the tradable goods sector, Chile’s 
engine of growth. Since 2005, a strong tendency towards an appreciation of the 
exchange rate has developed, but the central bank has refrained from intervening. In 
early 2008 the nominal exchange rate, peso/dollar appreciated more than 10 per cent in 
nominal terms in an atmosphere of high copper prices, weak dollar on international 
currency markets and the government’s strong dollar-surplus.10 However, since 
September 2008, there has been a sharp reversal of the exchange rate; late October 2008 
the exchange rate was nearly CLP670 per US dollar, in contrast to March 2008 when 
the exchange rate was CLP440 to the US$.  
 
Figure 5 
Chile: Inflation rate, 1960-2007  













































































































                                                 
10  The free floating regime has produced:  
  (i) a decline in ‘pass-through’ coefficients between exchange rate and prices that reduce the 
inflationary effect of currency depreciations;  
  (ii) small liability-dollarization in the banking system although the increased external indebtedness of 
the corporate sector reduces this effect; and  
  (iii) the development of more sophisticated financial instruments to deal with exchange fluctuations, 
see De Gregorio and Tokman (2004).  15 
Figure 6 
Chile: Nominal exchange rate, 1984-2008  


















































































































Source:   Own elaboration based on data from Central Bank of Chile. 
 
Figure 7 
Chile: Real exchange rate, 1977-2008 











































































Note:   Data points correspond to annual average real exchange rate, except for the year 2008 which 
applies to January only. An increase in the index indicates depreciation and a decline is an 
appreciation. 
Source:   Own elaboration based on data from Central Bank of Chile.  16 
Disinflation and monetary policy  
In 1990, inflation was 27.3 per cent, converging to less than 3 per cent by 2006 (but by 
2007 inflation had accelerated to over 7 per cent due to several food and energy price 
increases). The decline in inflation (see Figure 5) is also a part of a general shift to a low 
inflation regime in the world economy. Chile established an independent central bank at 
the end of the Pinochet regime in the late 1980s with the mandate of ensuring low and 
stable inflation and normalcy in internal and external payments. Thus, its only 
policy objective is to ensure low inflation. Growth and full employment are not included 
as policy objectives according to the constitutional chart of the Chilean Central Bank. 
This is certainly different from the central banks of several developed economies, 
starting with the US Federal Reserve.11 It is argued that the strong anti-inflationary 
mandate of the Chilean independent central bank has contributed to the attainment of 
lower inflation. 
At the same time, it is apparent that the policy actions of a central bank also affect 
output and employment and that the central banks can cause cycles and even deepen 
recessionary shocks (as it seems was the case in the late 1990s). In fact, the central bank 
induced a credit crunch in 1998-99 which, along with the reduced exchange rate 
flexibility, probably amplified on the domestic output and employment the real effects 
of the external shocks associated with the global turbulence of 1997-99. Monetary 
policy in recent years has operated using an inflation target of 2-4 per cent, but in 2007 
inflation jumped over 7 per cent due to higher oil prices, higher food prices and 
relatively easy monetary policy of the preceding years.   
Macroeconomic performance of the four democratic administrations since 1990  
Comparing the macroeconomic and growth performance across the last four 
government administrations since 1990 (at the time of writing this paper, Bachelet is in 
her third year of the four-year administration), we find some differences in outcomes 
and in underlying macro policies (see Tables 3 and 4). Economic growth was the 
highest during the Aylwin administration (an average of 7.8 per cent per year in 1990-
94) and the lowest during the Lagos administration, with an average GDP growth of 4.4 
per cent per year over the period 2000-05.12 The growth record of the Bachelet 
administration in 2006-08 is only marginally better (4.8 per cent per year) but only up to 
mid 2008, in a context of record-high copper prices. Also the average rate of 
unemployment was the highest during the Lagos administration (see Table 3).  
In turn, inflation was the highest under Aylwin (annual average 17.7 per cent) and the 
lowest under Lagos (2.9 per cent per annum). The macro performance of the Frei Ruiz-
Tagle administration ranks between the Aylwin and Lagos regimes in terms of growth 
(lower than under Aylwin but faster than during Lagos) and inflation (higher than under 
Lagos but lower than during Aylwin). Obviously, initial economic conditions and the 
international economy shape the growth record of any administration. For example, the 
                                                 
11 Of course monetary authorities cannot be completely oblivious to the real cycles of the economy and 
the effects of its own policies on the intensity and timing of these cycles. Also as part of the 
accountability mechanisms, central bank authorities report every year to the congress on the march of 
the economy. A recent analysis of the topic is contained in Williamson (2008). 
12 This will probably go up when the year 2005 is included if the forecast of nearly 6 per cent growth 
realizes.  17 
complex international scenario associated with the Asian and Russian crises impacted 
on the Frei government in 1997-98 and, to some extent, also affected the Lagos 
government (until 2003). In turn, the Bachelet administration has benefited from two 
and half years from unprecedented high copper prices, the government’s main source of 
fiscal revenues. On the whole, fiscal policy has been austere during the four 
Concertación governments. Under the fiscal rule adopted by the Lagos administration, 
fiscal deficit declined, and then turned into very large surpluses under the Bachelet 
administration. In general all the Concertación governments maintained moderate to 
low current account deficits, which by 2006-07 had turned to an average surplus of 3.6 
per cent of GDP.  
Table 3 
Chile: Economic performance by administrations, 1990-2008 









GDP growth rate, %5      
Total  7.80 5.50 4.40 4.80 
Per  capita  5.90 4.10 3.20 3.80 
Inflation rate, %5  17.70 6.10 2.90 5.20 
Real wage (index 2000 = 100)6 74.21  92.03  104.17  111.20 
Real wages (rate of variation), %6 3.74 3.82 1.61 2.39 
Unemployment, %7  7.30 7.30 9.70 7.60 
Fiscal balance (% of GDP)5  1.60 1.10 0.70 9.00 
Terms of trade (index 1996 = 100)5 93.25 102.22 114.98 163.70 
Current account (% of GDP)5 -2.50  -3.50  -0.24 3.61 
Sources and notes: 
  1  Presidential term = March 1990 to March 1994. Data period covers the years 1990-93; 
  2  Presidential term = March 1994 to March 2000. Data period covers the years 1994-99; 
  3  Presidential term = March 2000 to March 2006. Data period covers the years 2000-05; 
  4  Presidential term = March 2006 to March 2010: Data period covers the years 2006-08 (Jan.)  
  5  Central Bank of Chile; 
  6  Merged series: for the years 1990-93, ECLAC (base 1980 = 100); for the years 1994-2006, 
INE (n.d.); 
  7 INE  (n.d.). 
 
Table 4 
Chile: Economic performance by administrations, 1990-2008 
 Administration  of: 
    Aylwin 
(1990-94) 
    Frei 
(1994-99) 









Monetary  policy  Eclectic Eclectic Inflation targeting  Inflation targeting 
Fiscal policy  Austere  
(without fiscal rule) 
Moderately austere
(without fiscal rule) 
Rule of structural 
fiscal surplus: 1% 
of GDP 
Rule of structural 
fiscal surplus: 0.5% 
of GDP (from 2007) 
Taxes on short-term 
capital flows 
Yes Yes No  No 
Source:  Own elaboration; Solimano and Pollack (2006). 18 
4  The social record of the post-Pinochet administrations  
This section focuses on the social dimension of the Chilean model during the post-
Pinochet period. In a nutshell, the main achievement was the rapid decline in poverty, 
and the main failure the inability to reduce the inequality of income and wealth. Poverty 
(measured as the per cent of the population living below a certain poverty line) declined 
from levels exceeding 40 per cent in the late 1980s to around 14 per cent in 2006 (see 
Table 5). The decline in poverty is largely a by-product of the acceleration of growth 
taking place. As depicted in Figure 8 there is a clear inverse relation between GDP 
growth and poverty. In spite of the acceleration in growth and the decline in poverty 
over the last 20 years, the Gini coefficient, above 0.55 for most of the time, remains 
virtually flat for this period (with a slight decline in 2006).13 In this section, we focus on 
the issue of the persistence of inequality.14  
Table 5 


















Chile                
 1987  45.1  17.4  57.7  57.7   47.40  3.20  54.00 
 1990  38.6  12.9  56.3  56.2   47.30  3.80  39.00 
 1992  32.6  8.8  56.2  55.9   47.40  4.10  35.00 
 1994  27.5  7.6  56.3  54.9   47.20  3.80  37.00 
 1996  23.2  5.7  57.6  56.3   47.10  3.20  54.00 
 1998  21.7  5.6  57.8  57.0   47.40  3.20  53.00 
 2000  20.6  5.7  57.8  57.2   47.90  3.20  57.00 
 2003  18.8  4.7  56.7  55.0   46.90  3.50  46.00 
 2006  14.5  3.2  55.2  53.2   44.70  3.40  45.00 
Other countries                 
Brazil 2001      59.3      46.95  2.47  53.97 
Finland 2000      26.9      22.57 9.62  5.61 
Ireland 1997      34.3     27.23  7.44  9.36 
Portugal 1997      38.5      29.84  5.75  14.99 
Spain 2000      34.7      26.61  6.97  10.35 
Sweden 2000      25.0      22.18  9.12  6.20 
USA 2000     40.8      29.85  5.44  15.00 
Uruguay 2000      44.6      33.71  4.78  18.62 
Source:  Own elaborations for Chile, based on Ministry of Planning (CASEN Surveys, 1987-2006);  
  For other countries, World Bank (2007). 
 
                                                 
13 The exact number of people exiting poverty is sensitive to the definition of the poverty line. In Chile 
poverty lines are calculated based on consumption shares recorded in the household surveys of the 
1980s. Observers argue that this is a low poverty line (diminishing measured poverty). 
14 See Solimano (1998, 2005) for a discussion on the theories of inequality and social policy. On the 
links between distributive justice and economic development, see Solimano, Aninat and Birdsall 
(2000). There is a growing economic literature, which indicates that inequality of income and wealth 
(closely related to inequality of opportunities) is problematic for both ethical and instrumental reasons 
Inequality can harm growth through various channels, generating social polarization and political 
instability, inviting higher taxation that is detrimental to investment. In addition, in unequal societies 
there is an economic loss, as many talented individuals and excluded social groups cannot realize their 
productive potential because of the paucity of credit, limited information on opportunities, lack of 
social contacts, and reduced access to political power. 19 
Figure 8 
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Source:   Own elaboration based on data from Central Bank of Chile (GDP) and Ministry of Planning 
(CASEN Surveys for poverty rate and Gini coefficient estimation). 
 
The Chilean experience of the last two decades illustrates the complexities and nuances 
of the relation between economic growth and social inequality. Contrary to the 
predictions of a negative relation between inequality and growth based on the modern 
theory of political economy (developed by Alesina and Rodrik 1994 and others), 
persistent inequality in Chile apparently did not harm growth (and was largely 
unaffected by growth itself) in the last 20 years (although the pace of poverty reduction 
could have been faster if inequality, for a given rate of growth of GDP, had been lower). 
However, this is not the only sign of a possible relation between growth and inequality: 
older theories of savings-driven growth15 predict that a certain concentration in income 
distribution is needed to boost national savings and finance growth. This suggests a 
positive relation between inequality and growth (this was part of Kaldor’s (1954) 
critique that capitalist growth and income concentration go hand in hand). In Chile, it is 
also apparent that the acceleration of economic growth per se has not led to a decline in 
inequality. That high and stable Gini coefficients coexist with relatively rapid growth is 
an empirical conundrum, and suggests that both variables (inequality and growth) 
behave independently from each other.16  
Despite the reduction of poverty in the recent past, evidence shows that the vulnerability 
to poverty is still a potential problem, particularly during recessions. In fact, it is 
estimated that nearly 30 per cent of the population have incomes within 40 per cent of 
the official poverty line (see Lopez and Miller 2008). This reveals that significant 
                                                 
15  For example, in the Kaldor model, workers have a lower propensity to save than capitalists. 
16 Solimano and Torche (2007) investigate this issue for Chile and note a degree of independence 
between both variables. See World Bank (2005) World Development Report 2005/06 devoted to 
equity and development that stresses the multidimensional nature of inequality as encompassing both 
economic, institutional and political determinants. 20 
numbers (of people) could fall into poverty if the economy is hit by adverse shocks. 
Inequality data highlight a picture of significant and persistent disparities in income: the 
richest top 10 per cent of the population in Chile captures nearly 47 per cent of the 
income until 2003 and 45 per cent in 2006. In contrast the bottom 20 per cent captures 
only 3.4 per cent of income in 2006. The Gini coefficient for autonomous income (say, 
the income earned on the market before government subsidies and transfers) had in the 
1987-2006 period an average value of 56.8, declining slightly thereafter. In turn, the 
Gini coefficient for total income—that which includes state transfers and subsidies—is 
slightly below the Gini for autonomous income but the differences are not very 
significant. These Gini values are at the high-end with respect to Latin America, a 
region already characterized by high inequality (see Table 5).  
Panels A and B of Figure 9 show the shares of income by deciles and ventiles (the 
distribution ordered by groups of 5 per cent). It is apparent from Figure 9 that inequality 
of incomes in Chile is mainly due to concentration at the top (the richest 10 and 5 per 
cent) rather than acute poverty at the bottom of the distribution. In turn, income 
distribution is relatively even (lower disparities of income) from the first to the ninth 
deciles. The main difference is in the income share of the top decile relative to the rest. 
The same point can be made by looking at Table 6 where the values of the Gini 
coefficients for the complete distribution (from deciles 1- 10) are significant higher than 
the Gini for the deciles 1-9 (and 10th). In fact, if the top decile is excluded from the 
overall distribution, the resulting inequality levels are not too different from those 
exhibited by the more egalitarian countries (a Gini below 0.4, see Table 5).17 Our 
measure of inequality focuses on income flows. However, wealth distribution is often 
much more concentrated than income distribution. Using data on wealth from a 
UNU-WIDER study on wealth distribution (Davis et al. 2006), it is apparent that the 
Gini coefficients for wealth are significantly higher than the Gini coefficients for 
income at the country level (see Solimano 2008).  
An indicator of wealth concentration in Chile can be extracted from the Forbes 
Magazine publication that has collated information since 1982 on the wealth levels of 
 
Figure 9 
Chile: Income averages by income groups, 2006 
Panel A: Deciles 
 
Panel B: Ventiles 
 
Source:   Own elaboration based on Ministry of Planning (CASEN Survey 2006). 
                                                 
17 A mathematical note is relevant here: due to the formula of the Gini that includes several interaction 
terms the total (or average) Gini coefficient for the whole distribution is not the average of the Gini for 
the individual sub-components. 21 
the ‘super-rich’ (billionaires). As Table 7 shows, Chile, out of a total population of 16 
million people, has four billionaires (individuals whose net worth is estimated to exceed 
one billion dollars). The estimated combined wealth of the four richest people in Chile 
is 12.5 per cent of the country’s GDP (estimated for 2008). As a reference point, the 
United States in 2007 had 406 billionaires (out of a population of 300 million) whose 
combined wealth amounted to around 10 per cent of the GDP of the US. Wealth 
concentration seems to be lower in the US than in Chile!  
 
Table 6 
Chile: Gini coefficients by income groups, 1987-2006 
Year  Total Gini, %    Gini, 1st-9th deciles, %  Gini, 10th decile, % 
1987 57.7    39.5  34.3 
1990 56.3    36.4  37.6 
1992 56.2    36.0  38.2 
1994 56.3    37.0  39.4 
1996 57.6    39.6  37.1 
1998 57.8    39.6  36.4 
2000 57.8    38.3  40.0 
2003 56.7    37.5  39.6 
2006 55.2    38.1  35.3 
Average 56.8    38.0  37.5 
Source:  Solimano and Torche (2007), based on Ministry of Planning (CASEN Surveys, 1987-2006. 
 
Table 7 
Chile: Individuals with the largest net worth, 2004-08 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008    Forbes ranking 
  In millions US$ (current)    2007  2008
Andrónico Luksic1 3,400 4,200 – – 10,000    –  77
Anacleto Angelini2 2,500 2,900 3,700 6,00 1,000   119  1062
Eliodoro Matte and family  2,800 2,700 4,100 5,600 7,900   137  117
Sebastián Piñera  – – – 1,200 1,300    799  897
Total of the four major fortunes 8,700 9,800 7,800 12,800 20,200     
Chile’s GDP (in current US$) 95,026 115,000 145,841 154,0003 161,7004    
Four major fortunes as % of GDP  9.16 8.52 5.35  8.31 12.49       
Notes:  1  Luksic died in August 2005; inherited by his widow, Iris Fontbona and family; 
  2  Angelini died in August 2007; inherited by his widow, Maria Noseda Zambra; 
  3  GDP 2007 estimated on the basis of a growth rate of 5.2%; 
  4  GDP 2008 calculated, based on the average of the projection range (4.5-5%) from the 
Central Bank of Chile. 
Source:  Own elaboration on the basis of data from Fazio (2005), Forbes (2008) and World Bank (2007). 
4.1  On the causes of the persistence of inequality  
Why does inequality remain so high in Chile? Several explanations can be put forward 
to account for the level and persistency of inequality. These explanations combine the 
effect of globalization, wealth concentration, and lack of social mobility, labour market 
and political economy factors: 22 
i)  Skewed access to the opportunities opened by globalization and liberalization 
policies. Markets become larger with external opening and the scope for 
wealth creation expands, but these opportunities tend to be captured by 
individuals with tertiary education levels, with entrepreneurial drive and 
risk-taking attitudes in addition to good social connections and access to credit. 
As access to education in Chile is stratified by income levels, these gains tend 
to accrue more to high-income individuals. Entrepreneurship and risk-taking 
attitudes may be distributed more randomly across populations but access to 
enabling factors such as credit or social connections is, in any case, far from 
being uniformly distributed in society.  
ii)  There is a significant concentration of ownership in key sectors of the 
economy in Chile such as banking, manufacturing, retail trade, private pension 
managing companies (AFP) and private health providers (ISAPRES), 
pharmacies and other sectors with high rates of return for unit of invested 
capital (see Solimano 2007). This creates super-normal profits and contributes 
to income inequality.  
iii)  Strong differences in the quality of private and public school systems. There 
are large differences in the amount of resources per student of the public 
school system compared to private schools (a ratio of approximately one to 
four); as education is the main mechanism of upward social mobility, children 
of the working classes and the middle class generally attend lower quality 
public schools while the offspring of the upper-middle class and elites go to 
the better quality private schools. This difference between the two school 
systems creates a powerful mechanism of preserving social inequality in the 
Chilean society.  
iv)  Low level of worker unionization and limited bargaining power of the working 
classes reduce its capacity to appropriate a higher share of the productivity 
gains generated by a growing economy, a point underscored already by the 
famous David Ricardo. This also affects the labour share in national income.  
v)  An apparent low preference by the authorities for public policies oriented 
towards reducing income and wealth inequality. This was the case not only in 
the Pinochet regime but also during the democratic governments in power 
since 1990. During the later periods, social policies have focused more on 
poverty reduction and social protection than on the alleviation of inequality, 
failing to exploit the complementarities between the two set of policies.  
4.2  The segmentation of social services and the persistency of inequality 
The persistence of inequality nearly two decades after the restoration of democracy is 
one of the salient features of the Chilean model. This raises some intriguing questions 
on the relationship between democracy and equality that deserve further analysis. It also 
shows a shift away from the redistributive economics in the historical social priorities of 
the Chilean centre-left.18 The social policies of the Concertación governments have 
                                                 
18  Part of the ‘traditional left, in Chile, i.e., the Chilean Communist Party, is not in government nor party 
to the coalition that has ruled since 1990.  23 
been guided by at least four underlying general principles: (i) economic growth is the 
main force to reduce poverty measured on an income basis (in reference to a poverty 
line); (ii) increase in the level and better targeting of monetary transfers to the very poor 
and most vulnerable, (iii) increase in public spending in education, health, housing and 
pensions, (iv) more recently the Lagos and Bachelet governments started reforms in the 
systems of private provision of social services in health care and in the pensions system, 
also the Bachelet government has expanded pre-school education and created a number 
of new nursery homes for children while their parents work. The Bachelet government 
has put more emphasis on social protection than the other previous Concertación 
governments. The main features of social and labour policies of the post-1990 period 
are period are summarized in Table 8.  
Table 8 
Chile: Social matrix, by government administration, 1990-2008 
 Administration  of: 
     Aylwin 
(1990-94) 
    Frei 
(1994-99) 




Poverty Decreases  Decreases Decreases Decreases 
Inequality (Gini coefficient)  High  High  High  Small decline 
Increase & focalization 
 of subsidies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Minimum wage  Real increase  Real increase  Real increase  Real increase 
Education:      
Expenditure  Increase Increase Increase Increase 













Health:      
Expenditure  Increase Increase Increase Increase 
Reforms Strengthening 









law for Isapres 
 
Social  security  reforms  No No No Yes;  approved  in 
2007 
Goals for greater equality 
made explicit 
No No No Unclear 
Deconcentration of 
property policy 
No No No Partial 
Strengthening of trade 
unions & social 
organizations 
Light Light Light Light 
Consumer defence policy      Creation of a 
board of free 
competition; 
modification of  
the consumer law 
More active 
Democratization 
of the access to credit 
Partial Partial Partial/increases Partial/increases 
Source:  Own elaborations; Solimano and Pollack (2006). 24 
In retrospect, the priorities of the social and labour policies of the democratic 
administrations are characterized by:  
i)  The lack of explicit and active policies oriented towards reducing income 
inequality and anti-trust policies for preventing a concentration of ownership 
and wealth in economic conglomerates in critical sectors of the economy;  
ii)  The lagged consideration of the middle class as a valid target of social policy, a 
trend partially redressed in the Lagos and Bachelet administrations through the 
expansion of health and social security benefits to this population group;  
iii)  An excessive emphasis on targeting that generated (often unintended) 
exclusions of social benefits for border-line individuals, including children;  
iv)  Underinvestment in public education, as reflected in the very significant 
difference in the level of spending per student between public and private 
schools;19 and  
v)  The absence of labour legislation oriented towards rebalancing the bargaining 
power of workers and employers that had been severely debilitated during the 
Pinochet regime.  
The increased privatization of social services (schools, private health providers, private 
capitalization of pensions) that was started during the military regime and was 
continued with the advent of democracy created a highly segmented regime for access 
to health and education services. The private system serves the upper-middle classes 
and the rich (the only segments of the population that can afford to pay for privately 
provided social services), whereas the bulk of the middle class and the poor are in the 
public system with generally under-funded public schools and hospitals. Furthermore, 
the private social security system had some discriminatory rules against women and 
very stringent criteria applying to eligibility to minimum pensions. Some of these 
limitations have been addressed by the Lagos and Bachelet administrations; in fact, 
President Bachelet started talking of establishing a ‘state of social rights’ in Chile. This 
has shifted then to a state of social protection. The main concrete step in this direction is 
the recent reform of the social security system oriented towards improving minimum 
pensions, making its coverage universal, correcting inequities in the system against 
women, and other changes. Nevertheless, the new law preserves, virtually intact, the 
high-fee private capitalization pension system in which private companies administer 
the pensions of millions of people. The vulnerability of the system has become apparent 
with the financial crisis of 2008 which led to a decline in the value of pensions of 
various higher profitability-high risk portfolios of the pension plans.   
4.4  Labour market, workers unionization and social conditions 
The link between the social conditions of the population and the workings of the labour 
market is important. Various authors—Riesco (2008) Solimano and Pollack (2006) 
Infante and Sunkel (2004)—have studied these links with respect to Chile. Several 
conclusions emerge from these studies:  
                                                 
19  See Lopez and Miller (2008).  25 
i)  Poor families are more vulnerable to negative economic shocks than the non-
poor, as the poor have larger families, a lower number of income earners and 
have higher dependency ratios; 
ii)  Poor families (indigent and poor non-indigents) have a high incidence of 
unemployed and inactive members; 
iii)  The incidence of unemployment among the poor is closely related to their 
education level, which is much lower among the poor income strata;  
iv)  Workers coming from indigent and poor households tend to work in lower 
productivity sectors,  
v)  The Chilean labour market is characterized by job fragility, frequent shifts of 
workers across jobs and from employment to unemployment (Riesco 2008). 
This implies that the degree of job fragility and vulnerability is particularly 
serious for women and low-skilled workers. One consequence of this is the 
non-attainment of the minimum pension in the private capitalization system 
which, as minimum requirement, implies continuous contributions for 20 years 
(often related to a stable job) in order to qualify for such minimum pension. 
vi)  There is significant segmentation in the Chilean labour market between the 
formal and informal sectors. According to Infante and Sunkel (2004), while 
around 87 per cent of the workers in the formal sector have formal work-
contracts, only 50 per cent of informal workers have it. In addition, social 
security benefits are available to 84 per cent of the workers in the formal 
section versus only 35 per cent of those in the informal sector. Working 
conditions are generally also worse in the informal sector (longer working 
hours and less safety at the work-place). Informal sector workers are less 
educated (average education amounting to 9.6 years) than formal workers 
(average education of 12.2 years); also poverty is higher among informal 
sector workers than within the formal sector. Furthermore, working women are 
concentrated in the informal sector, where they earn lower salaries than men 
(20 per cent less in the formal and 45 per cent less in the informal sector). 
vii)  The degree of labour unionization in Chile is very low. It started to decline 
during the military regime and the trend continued with the return of 
democracy. Before the 1973 military coup, the rate of unionization was over 
20 per cent, declined to 16 per cent in 1992 and to 11 per cent in 2006. In 
addition, the per cent of workers subject to collective bargaining is currently 
around 8 per cent (Riesco 2008).  
4.5  The rise of crime and insecurity 
A worrisome feature of urban life and social conditions that concerns all segments of 
Chile’s population, is the significant increase in urban violence, robbery and crime of 
the last 10-15 years. According to statistics, the number of people per 100,000 
inhabitants reporting incidence of violence associated with assaults, robbery and 
stealing has increased by 124 per cent between 1990 and 2005 (Beyer and Vergara 
2006).20 A detailed explanation for the rise in violence and robbery in this period is an 
                                                 
20 Unfortunately, statistics for this period on the actual number of violent, robbery-related incidents are 
not available.  26 
important topic for future research.21 But some factors contributing to increased urban 
violence and crime can already be highlighted: a high incidence of unemployment 
among the youth, a segment often found to be engaged in robbery and crime, the fact 
that as the economy grows and prospers, expectations of economic advancement 
become more common among all population groups. However, in a country with high 
inequality and limited upward social mobility such as Chile, some people—particularly 
the unemployed or precariously employed, often young individuals coming from low-
income or dysfunctional families—may feel that they share relatively little of the macro 
prosperity and therefore resort to crime especially in the affluent urban neighbourhoods, 
as Beyer and Vergara (2006) observe. Also they often come from weakly constituted or 
fragmented families. This latter factor in Beyer’s and Vergara’s statistical analysis is 
denoted by a variable showing the proportion of families in which the head of 
household are women; this variable, in turn, has a statistical significant effect on the rate 
of reported cases of crime and violence. Also the rate of urbanization has a positive 
effect on reported crime, confirming the presumption that this is mainly an urban 
phenomenon. The cost of undertaking a crime survey proxied by the number of arrests 
and time spent in jail as well as some anti-crime policies (the programme called Plan 
Cuadrante but apparently not for the Barrio Seguro) has a negative effect on the 
reported crime rates. In any case, social conditions such as fragility of employment, 
inequality and rising expectations along with increasing urbanization and insufficient 
police and judiciary systems may account for the expansion of crime in Chile. 
5  Looking at the future: development potential, competitiveness,  
and quality of life in Chile  
Over the last two decades, Chile has shown that it has been able to grow at respectably 
high rates even though the growth process has not always been steady. The ‘consensus 
forecast’ of the government and local economists is that Chile’s potential growth is 
about 5 per cent per year in the medium run. These predictions, of course, will be 
affected by how the current international financial crisis impacts on the Chilean 
economy. Although this rate of growth is below the average observed in the last two 
decades, it yields a respectable GDP growth rate per capita of 3.5 per cent per year 
(assuming a population growth of 1.5 per cent per annum). Of course, all these 
projections are conditional on the behaviour of the main long-run determinants of 
economic growth in addition to demographic trends. On the economic side, a critical 
variable will be the level and quality of investment in human and physical capital, rate 
of growth of total factor productivity, the efficiency of resource allocation and the 
quality of public policies. Investment and innovation require the stability of rules of the 
game as well as stability in the macro, social and political arenas. Excessive inequality 
can be a potential destabilizing factor if compounded by modest growth and 
disappointed expectations. A hundred of years ago, Chile lived through a period of 
initially high development expectations that were later dashed in the early twentieth 
century. It is also very important to invest in ‘enabling social and institutional factors’, 
such as a good level of education, research and development, low bureaucracy and 
moderate costs of conducting business, effectiveness and quality of institutions 
                                                 
21 One of the few empirical studies on the determinants of crime and violence in Chile is Beyer and 
Vergara (2006). 27 
(including the incidence of corruption). Chile does well by international standards on 
some of these scores. In others, the record is less than brilliant (see Table 9). 
Chile faces perhaps one of its more important challenges on the education front. 
According to the international PISA and TIMSS tests of educational attainment for 
middle and high school students in science, reading and math, Chile is well below the 
OECD standard, although above that of Latin America (on the PISA test). Public 
expenditure per student (as a share of GDP) is 4.4 percentage points below the OECD 
level in primary education, 10 percentage points in secondary education and   
15 percentage points in tertiary education. In tertiary education, public spending in 
Chile is near 20 percentage points below the average for Latin America (Table 9). 
However, these large differences are probably due to the increasing importance of 
Chile’s private university system, so public spending in tertiary education can 
underestimate the overall effort in this sector.  
Expenditure on research and development in Chile is about one-fifth of the average of 
OECD countries. The number of Chilean researchers in R&D activities is just a fraction 
of those in OECD, but twice the number of the Latin American average.  
Chile has low indices of perceived corruption (i.e., Transparency International) and is 
close to the levels of OECD in this matter. However, in recent years the incidence of 
irregular practices and of corruption in the public sector has risen. Bureaucratic 
corruption22 seems to be low but ‘political corruption’ is apparently on the rise and 
‘party quotas’ for the appointment of government officials at different levels in the 
public administration exist. It has been noted that ‘party operators’ in the public sector 
try to extract from various government agencies and ministries resources for financing 
their political campaigns, patronage or jobs and contracts for family, party-members and 
friends. The magnitude and extent of these practices are still largely an open question.  
At the same time, with respect to the criterion cost/ease of doing business, Chile scores 
relatively well according to the World Bank index that measures the various 
considerations affecting the cost of establishing and running a business: the time to set 
up or discontinue a company, difficulties with regard to tax payments, labour 
regulations, or cost of credit. In the index ranking countries according to the level of 
business costs, from lower to higher cost, Chile is in 33rd place in a list of 178 
countries. The average for Latin America is 89 while the OECD average is 28. In 
addition, Chile’s degree of competitiveness (see competitiveness index in Table 9) is 
close to the OECD levels and above that of Latin America.  
On the criterion of the quality of life, Chile scores relatively high in the human 
development index; closer to the average of OECD, and above that of Latin America. 
Life expectancy for females is 81 years of age and 74 years for males. Health indicators 
for children are good, particularly with regard to the low indices on diarrhoea. Negative 
trends in the quality of life, however, are the increased crime rates, congestion and 
pollution of the urban areas and extra time spent in public transportation, particularly in 
the capital city of Santiago after the inauguration of a new, but largely defective, system 
of public transportation (the Transantiago system).  
                                                 
22 See Tanzi (2008).  28 
Table 9 
Chile: Development indicators from an international perspective 
 Chile  OECD 
Latin America 
 & the Caribbean
Education: PISA(1 430 497  402.0 
 TIMMS(2 400 522  — 
Public expenditure per student (% of GDP per capita)(3 primary 14.12 18.51  12.02 
 secondary  14.87 25.01  14.66 
 tertiary  15.96 30.98  36.72 
Public spending in education (% of GDP)(3 3.87 5.21  4.31 
Science and technology (4    
Expenditure on R&D (% of GDP), 1996-2003  0.57 2.40  0.57 
R&D researches (per million people), 1990-2005  444.0 3,211.0  226.0 
Institutional quality and competitiveness     
Corruption perception index (5 7.0 7.25  3.72 
Cost of doing business(6 33.0 28.0  89.07 
Competitiveness index(7 4.77 5.00  3.89 
Health indictors and human development      
Life expectancy at birth (yrs)(8  male  74 76  69 
 female  81 81  74 
Death among children under 5-yrs due to (%):(8  diarrhoeal-related 0.50 0.90  7.88 
 pneumonia  6.2 2.49  8.51 
Human development index(9 0.87 0.93  0.78 
Sources and notes: 
  (1  Own elaboration based on data from OECD (2007) and Ministry of Education (2007). An 
average of the three areas of the test (science, reading and mathematics) was calculated to 
obtain a general score. Note: averages for Latin America were calculated on the basis of the 
results of six participating countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and 
Uruguay). 
  (2  Own elaboration based on data from Mullis et al. (2004: 34) and Martin et al. (2004: 36). The 
average for OECD was calculated based on available data for the 14 participating countries. 
No other country participated from Latin America and the Caribbean except Chile in this test. 
An average of the two areas of study (science and mathematics) was calculated to obtain a 
general score. 
  (3  World Bank (2007) for average of data for the 1999-2005 period. OECD corresponds to 
high-income OECD countries (25 nations). 
  (4  World Bank (2007). OECD corresponds to high-income OECD countries (25 nations); 
  (5  Transparency International. CPI score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as 
seen by business people, and country analysts, and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 
(highly corrupt). 
  (6  World Bank (2008). Ranking: 1 = the most business-friendly regulations; 178 = the least 
business-friendly. 
  (7  World Economic Forum (2007). Scores range from 1 to 7, with 7 = the most competitive. 
  (8  Averages calculated on data from WHO (2005) based on information for the latest year 
available. 
  (9  UNDP (2007). Values range between 0 and 1, with 1 = the highest level of human 
development. 
 
Physical environment is an important topic. Chile approved new legislation for the 
protection of the environment already in the early to mid 1990s. However, the 
prevailing institutional framework is characterized by the absence of a strong central 
entity (a ministry of the environment or equivalent) and responsibilities are spread 
across various agencies; the most important of these being the CONAMA (Corporación 29 
Nacional del Medio Ambiente, National Environmental Agency). Also the ministry of 
the presidency is responsible for a range of environmental issues in addition to various 
other issues such indigenous populations. Experts agree that Chile still devotes modest 
public budgets for environmental protection and that these miscellaneous agencies often 
lack the human and financial resources needed for monitoring and control in sensitive 
areas. On the other hand, part of the environmental spending in Chile is carried out by 
the private sector (e.g., water and sewerage treatment). A positive force for more 
environmental protection in Chile is coming from external sources: Chile’s free trade 
agreements with the United Sates, the European Union and other countries along with 
the impending accession to the OECD. With these agreements, there will be a need to 
enforce stricter environmental standards similar to the ones adopted in developed 
nations. How fast this convergence will take place is an open question.  
6 Final  remarks   
In the last twenty years or so, Chile has made important achievements in terms of the 
acceleration of economic growth, productive modernization and the consolidation of 
macroeconomic stability. Still, economic growth has decelerated in the last decade and 
the international financial crisis will very likely reduce growth in the short term. Free 
markets and a prominent role for the private sector have been the centrepieces of the 
development strategy started by the military. With the advent of democracy, a more 
gentle and human version of the economic model imposed in the military period has 
taken place. The democratic governments since 1990 have made advances in poverty 
reduction and social protection of the poor. However, democracy in Chile has failed to 
alleviate the high levels of social inequality and reduce the economic power of Chilean 
elites. It is interesting to note that a reasonable level of social peace and lack of serious 
social conflict have evolved in Chile in the last twenty years. This is interesting and 
perhaps puzzling at the same time: on the one hand, the acceleration of economic 
growth in terms of per capita income tends to reduce social tensions, but on the other 
hand, persistent inequality can increase social conflict. In Chile, however, weak unions 
and largely demobilized social movements may account for the tenuous link between 
inequality and conflict. Another possibility is that people prefer pro-grow policies, thus 
tolerating inequality, provided that the economy is growing. Can the high-inequality 
equilibrium be maintained indefinitely in the future? As societies become richer, its 
citizens will demand more social rights, less inequality and more social inclusion. A 
reduction in social inequality would require changes on several fronts: (i) more 
resources to the public sector for education; (ii) curtailing further concentration of 
wealth and market shares in banking, retail trade, private pensions systems and private 
health provision, and other sectors; (iii) more effective regulation of big business;   
(iv), enhanced bargaining power of labour unions and better labour rights and   
(v) effective support to the sector of small- and medium-sized enterprises. Chile needs 
to rebalance labour relations in the context of a more prosperous society that made 
labour unions increasingly marginalized. Another worrisome trend of the Chilean 
economic growth model is the impact on the environment and natural resource base, and 
its export orientation based on the intense exploitation of natural resources. The critical 
decision is whether Chile should continue pushing for growth along the same, decades-
old strategy of resource-intensity and neglect of inequality, or to rebalance the priorities 
of the development strategy for more social equality and protection of the environment.  30 
In a turbulent international economy, economic and financial policies to maintain the 
credit flow, inflation under control, the stability of the banking system and economic 
growth at a reasonable level will be essential. In addition, anti-crisis policies will need 
to support small-scale firms because this sector generates nearly 80 per cent of the 
country’s employment, activate public programmes that are intensive in employment 
and provide social protection to the poor and the middle classes. 
The Chilean model, with all its achievements, faces the limits of neoliberal economics 
for producing social equity and environmentally balanced development in unequal and 
highly stratified societies even when applied by social-democratic administrations 
subject to democratic scrutiny. The political economy correlate of a redefinition in 
development priorities may mean less power for the dominant elites (economic and 
political) and broader social participation for the middle class and the working people to 
support new and more equitable development priorities.  
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